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Probability theory requires that the disjunction of two events be judged at 
least as likely as either of those events. Two studies are described which imply 
that violations of this requirement are very common. The data also show that 
subjects do not commit disjunction errors because they misinterpret the dis- 
junctive statement “A or B” to mean “A or B, but not both.” Instead, the 
pattern of errors is consistent with a judgment process describable as averag- 
ing. These results provide support for a “signed combination model of quali- 
tative likelihood judgment.” This model generalizes a previous one which 
applied to judgments concerning conjunctive events (J. F. Yates and B. W. 
Carlson, 1986, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 37, 
230-253). 8 1989 Academic Press, Inc. 
A distinction is often drawn between the accuracy and coherence of 
probability judgments (e.g., Winkler & Murphy, 1968; Yates, 1982). Prob- 
ability judgments are accurate if they correspond to what takes place in 
the real world; they are coherent if they are internally consistent, that is, 
if they satisfy certain widely accepted principles about how probability 
judgments should relate to one another, such as the Kolmogoroff axioms 
(Hacking, 1965). Probability theory does not require that probability judg- 
ments be accurate. It does, however, demand that they be coherent. 
One fundamental requirement of probability theory is the extension 
rule: 
If A > B, then P(A) 2 P(B). 
That is, an event cannot be more likely than an event which contains it. 
The conjunction of two events is contained within each of those events. 
This research was supported in part by National Science Foundation Grant BNS 8605422. 
Requests for reprints should be sent to Bruce W. Carlson, Department of Psychology, Ohio 
University, Athens, OH 45701. 
368 
0749-5978189 $3.00 
Copyright Q 1989 by Academic Press, Inc. 
All tights of reproduction in any form reserved. 
DWUNCTION ERRORS 369 
Thus, by the extension rule, a conjunction cannot be more likely than 
either of its constituent marginal events. Formally, 
P(A & B) G P(A) and P(A & B) G P(B). 
Nevertheless, Tversky and Kahneman (1982, 1983) reported that people 
reliably judge a conjunction to be more likely than one of its two constit- 
uent events. Later, Yates and Carlson (1986) demonstrated that the inci- 
dence of such “conjunction errors” depends upon the perceived likeli- 
hoods of the marginal events composing the conjunction. For instance, 
when both marginals were thought to be likely it was not uncommon for 
the conjunction to be judged more likely than both of the marginals. Such 
conjunction errors occurred rarely otherwise. 
The extension rule pertains to disjunctions just as it does to conjunc- 
tions. However, unlike a conjunction, the disjunction of two events con- 
tains both of those events. Thus, a disjunction must be at least as likely as 
either of its constituent marginal events. Formally, 
P(A or B) 2 P(A) and P(A or B) 2 P(B). 
Do likelihood judgments for disjunctions conform to the extension rule? 
The existing evidence is mixed. Whereas Wyer (1976) and Morier and 
Borgida (1984) reported substantial violations of the extension rule for 
disjunctions, Beach and Peterson (1966), Wells (1985), and Biela (1986) 
found few such violations. Moreover, Biela concluded that, when his 
subjects did fail to follow the disjunction rule, often it was because they 
assigned the same probability to the disjunction as they did to the more 
likely of the marginal events. The lack of consensus among previous 
investigations implies that there is a need for careful study of how often 
and under what circumstances human likelihood judgments for disjunc- 
tions disagree with the extension rule. The present research was intended 
as an initial step in that direction. 
Some likelihood judgments are “quantitative.” That is, the person in- 
dicates a degree of certainty that an event will occur. An example is a 
meteorologist’s statement that there is a 40% chance of snow tomorrow, 
i.e., P’(Snow) = .40, where P' indicates a probability judgment rather 
than a formal probability. Other likelihood judgments are “qualitative” 
(cf. Krantz, Lute, Suppes, & Tversky, 1971, Chap. 5). That is, the person 
reports the relative likelihood of two or more events, e.g., that snow is 
more likely than rain. “Logically,” the ordering of quantitative likelihood 
judgments should agree with an individual’s explicit qualitative likelihood 
judgments. For instance, if a forecaster judges snow to be more likely 
than rain, we would expect the forecaster’s probability judgment of snow 
to be greater than that of rain. However, there is no necessary relation 
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between qualitative and quantitative likelihood judgments. In qualitative 
judgments, usually the alternatives can be compared directly. Attention is 
focused on aspects of the alternatives which distinguish them, and editing 
procedures can be adopted to reduce the difficulty in making the judgment 
(Kahneman 8z Tversky, 1979; Russo & Dosher, 1983; Tversky, 1969). In 
contrast, in quantitative judgments, usually each alternative must be 
judged individually. The simplifying strategies used to make qualitative 
judgments are not useful in making quantitative judgments. The prefer- 
ence reversal phenomenon exemplifies the differences between qualita- 
tive and quantitative judgment (Lichtenstein & Slavic, 1971). 
Some of the earlier studies of disjunction errors used quantitative judg- 
ments, while others required qualitative assessments. The present studies 
were intended to document the existence of disjunction errors using qual- 
itative likelihood judgments and, if such errors are observed, to use the 
pattern of errors to shed light on the fundamental judgment processes 
people use. 
STUDY 1 
The first study sought initial indications of the extent of violations of 
the extension rule for disjunctions in qualitative likelihood judgment. As 
indicated above, our previous studies showed that the incidence of con- 
junction errors depends on the perceived likelihood of the relevant mar- 
ginal events (Yates & Carlson, 1986). There were no theoretical reasons 
to expect a comparable strong dependency for disjunction errors a priori. 
Nevertheless, the perceived likelihoods of the marginal events represent 
boundary conditions that should not be dismissed in advance. Thus, an 
attempt was made to vary the likelihood of the marginal events. 
Method 
Subjects. One hundred live subjects recruited from the clients at a local 
law o&e and from the students and staff at the University of Michigan 
participated in this experiment. The subjects were paid. 
Materials. Subjects were presented a questionnaire containing four 
judgment problems. Each problem consisted of four events which the 
subjects were asked to rank order by their probability of occurrence, 
using the number 1 for the most likely event, the number 2 for the second 
most likely event, and so on. Only two of the problems were pertinent to 
the present study.’ These problems consisted of the four events: A, B, (A 
& B), and (A or B). 
’ The other two problems were conjunction problems. These were discussed in Yates and 
Carlson (1986). 
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Two versions of each problem were constructed. In one version (LL), 
both marginal events were expected to be seen as likely, i.e., more likely 
to occur than not; in the other version (VU), both marginal events were 
expected to be seen as unlikely, i.e., less likely to occur than not. Table 
1 contains both versions of all four marginal events. 
Two forms of the questionnaire were constructed. The two versions of 
each problem (LL vs UU) were randomly assigned to the two forms of the 
questionnaire subject to the restriction that the two forms contain two LL 
problems, including one disjunction problem, and two UU problems, in- 
cluding one disjunction problem. 
Subjects completed the questionnaire individually. 
Results and Discussion 
The data from four subjects were excluded from the data analysis be- 
cause the subjects assigned the same rank to two or more events. For the 
remaining subjects, the number of disjunction errors was recorded for 
each problem: 0 if a subject judged the disjunction to be more likely than 
both of the marginal events, 1 if a subject judged the disjunction to be less 
likely than one of the marginal events, and 2 if a subject judged the 
disjunction to be less likely than both of the marginal events. The data of 
the law offtce clients and the students were combined because no differ- 
ences between the groups were detected. 
The results are contained in Table 2. They reveal that qualitative judg- 
TABLE 1 
MARGINAL EVENTS FOR DI~VJNCTION PROBLEMS IN STUDY 1 
Problem Likely Unlikely 
A U.S. auto companies 
will raise their average 
car prices by at least 
$25. 
B The Detroit Tigers will 
end the season with a 
better record than the 
Cleveland Indians. 
A Ronald Reagan will 
carry the South in the 
November 
Presidential election. 
B The movie “Breakin” 
will not be nominated 
for an Academy 
Award as “Best 
Picture.” - 
U.S. auto companies 
will raise their average 
car prices by less than 
$25. 
The Detroit Tigers will 
end the season with 
no better record than 
the Cleveland Indians. 
Walter Mondale will 
carry the South in the 
November 
Presidential election. 
The movie “Breakin” 
will be nominated for 
an Academy Award as 
“Best Picture.” 
- 
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TABLE 2 







0 1 2 0 1 2 
30.0 32.0 38.0 27.5 29.4 43.1 
45.1 45.1 9.8 36.0 40.0 24.0 
a N = 101. 
b x2(2) = 11.66, p = .003. 
= x*(2) = 4.19, p = .123. 
ments of disjunctions violate the extension rule. Indeed, for each problem 
over 50% of the subjects made at least one disjunction error. 
No clear result emerged from the manipulation of the likelihoods of the 
marginal events. The incidence of disjunction errors depended upon the 
likelihood of the marginal events in Problem 1, but not in Problem 2. In 
Problem 1, double disjunction errors occurred more frequently in the 
likely-likely than in the unlikely-unlikely version. 
STUDY 2 
One clear finding emerged from the first study: Generally, likelihood 
judgments about disjunctions do not satisfy the extension rule. Study 2 
had three aims: The first was to examine further the generality of exten- 
sion rule violations. The second was to test a specific explanation for the 
violations based on how people interpret disjunctions. Assuming that this 
explanation might be ruled out, the third was to test a particular model for 
how qualitative judgments about disjunctions are generated. These aims 
are discussed in turn. 
Generality 
The generality issue was addressed along several fronts. First, three 
additional judgment problems with very different content from those used 
in Study 1 were employed. Next, recall that, in Study 1, subjects rank- 
ordered events A, B, (A & B), and (A or B). That is, the irrelevant “filler” 
event was the conjunction (A & B). From the subject’s point of view the 
conjunction might have taken primary attention, implying less careful 
consideration of the disjunction (A or B). This is possible because con- 
junctions were clearly of interest in all the other problems the subjects 
were asked to solve. Thus, in Study 2 the filler event was always a 
disjunction, too. Finally, generality was also examined as it applied to the 
likelihoods of the marginal events. In each problem in Study 1, it was 
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intended that both of the marginals be seen as likely or that both be 
perceived as unlikely. In Study 2, there was an additional version of each 
problem in which one marginal event was to be likely, the other unlikely. 
Disjunction Interpretation 
Makus and Zajonc (1985) proposed that conjunction errors occur be- 
cause subjects misinterpret the marginal event A as the conjunction (A & 
not B) due to the presence of the conjunction (A & B). For example, after 
being asked to consider (A 8z B) = “Bill is an accountant who plays jazz 
for a hobby,” A = “Bill is an accountant” would be interpreted as (A & 
not B) = “Bill is an accountant who does not play jazz for a hobby.” 
Morier and Borgida (1984) found evidence that this explanation may in- 
deed account for some conjunction errors. 
In Study 2 a similar explanation for disjunction errors was tested. In 
natural language, the word “or” is often used exclusively, to rule out the 
possibility that two alternatives will both occur. For example, a child may 
be allowed to have one kind of dessert or another, but not both. In 
probability theory, “or” is used inclusively, to indicate not only that one 
of two alternatives may occur, but that both may occur, also. Therefore, 
the hypothesis was tested that subjects make disjunction errors because 
they misinterpret the disjunction (A or B) as the event (A or B, but not 
both). Note that the extension rule does not require that any particular 
relationship hold between the events A and B and the event (A or B, but 
not both). The strategy for testing the misinterpretation hypothesis was to 
sometimes state the disjunction (A or B) explicitly in the form (A or B, or 
both). If the hypothesis were viable, the explicit format should have led to 
fewer disjunction errors. 
Signed Averaging Model 
Our previous studies (Yates & Carlson, 1986) have shown that the 
following formalistic model provides a good account for some people’s 
likelihood judgments for conjunctions. 
A qualitative likelihood function X assigns to every event A a real 
number A(A), its qualitative likelihood index. For events A and B, A(A) 3 
X(B) if and only if A +B, where +, is the qualitative likelihood judgment 
relation interpreted to mean “is at least as likely as.” 
For arbitrary event A,X(A) > 0 if and only if A is seen as “likely,” i.e., 
A >,A’, where A’ indicates the complement of A; X(A) < 0 if and only 
if A is seen as “unlikely,” i.e., A’ P-~A; and A(A) = 0 if and only if A is 
seen as “indifferent,” i.e., A = LA’, where = L is the qualitative likeli- 
hood judgment relation interpreted to mean “is as equally likely as.” 
Qualitative likelihood indexes for conjunctions are derived from those 
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for the constituent marginal events according to the following signed sum 
rule fir conjunctions. For arbitrary events A and B, 
h(A & B) = A(A) + A(B). 
As can be readily seen, this model predicts that no conjunction errors will 
be made when both of the marginal events are seen as unlikely. It predicts 
single conjunction errors when one marginal event is unlikely, the other 
likely. It prescribes double conjunction errors when both marginals are 
thought to be likely. 
To account for disjunction errors, the following signed averaging rule 
for disjunctions is proposed. Again, for any events A and B, 
h(A or B) = w,A(A) + w,A(B), 
where 0 G w, c 1, 0 6 w2 6 1, and w1 + w2 = 1. The signed averaging 
rule predicts that a single disjunction error will occur, as long as two 
marginal events are not seen as equally likely. In the latter case, events A, 
B, and (A or B) should all be considered equally likely to one another. 
The structure described above is called the signed combination model 
of qualitative likelihood judgment. The aim of the model is to describe 
how a person uses some judgments to arrive at others. It remains to be 
shown why people follow the prescribed rules. However, it seems plau- 
sible that the summation aspect of the conjunction rule might derive its 
force from the linguistic connotations of the word “and,” viz., that one 
event amplifies or enhances the effects of one with which it is conjoined. 
Similarly, the averaging feature of the disjunction rule might be compel- 
ling because the word “or” connotes compromise. Signing is superfluous 
for the averaging rule; the same predictions would follow regardless of the 
signs of the individual likelihood indexes. One reason signing is retained 
throughout the model is that subjects do in fact seem to classify events 
phenomenologically into the categories we have labeled “likely,” 
“unlikely,” and “indifferent” (Yates & Carlson, 1986). A less important 
reason is that the resulting characterization is more parsimonious. 
The third major aim of Study 2 was to test the averaging rule. In a given 
judgment problem, that rule predicts that single disjunction errors should 
predominate, unless the relevant marginal events are equally likely. In the 
latter case, since in the present procedures ordering was forced, random 
ordering of events A, B, and (A or B) should be observed. If A is likely 
and B is unlikely, or vice versa, the prediction of the rule is clearly that 
(A or B) should be intermediate in judged likelihood. But suppose A and 
B are both seen as likely or are both thought to be unlikely. Then there is 
a greater chance that those events are perceived to be equally likely. 
Thus, the expectation that (A or B) would have intermediate likelihood 
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should be weaker. Single disjunction errors did not predominate in Study 
1. This might have been because a conjunction was used as the fdler item, 
as explained earlier, or because the subjects did not classify the events as 
likely and unlikely the way we intended them to do so. Thus, to provide 
a cleaner test of the averaging rule, in Study 2, a disjunction was used as 
the filler item and the subjects themselves indicated explicitly how they 
classified the given marginal events. 
Method 
Subjects. One hundred seventy-four students at Ohio University par- 
ticipated in this study as a course-credit option for an introductory psy- 
chology class. They were not paid. 
Materiuls and procedure. Each subject considered three problems pre- 
sented in a questionnaire. Each problem consisted of four events: A, B, 
(A or B), and (not A or not B). The order of the problems and the order 
of the events within each problem were randomly determined. Table 3 
contains the marginal events for the three problems. For each problem, 
subjects were asked to rank order the four events by their probability of 
occurrence, using the number 1 for the most likely event, the number 2 for 
the second most likely event, and so on. 
Three versions of each problem were constructed. As in Study 1, there 
were likely-likely (LL) and unlikely-unlikely (UU) versions, for which it 
was expected that subjects would consider both marginal events to be 
likely or unlikely, respectively. There was also a likely-unlikely (LU) 
version, for which one marginal was to be seen as likely, the other un- 
likely. The three versions of a problem were assigned to three different 
questionnaires. Each questionnaire contained one LL, one LU, and one 
UU problem. A fourth questionnaire was constructed, identical to one of 
the first three, except that the disjunction (A or B) was replaced by the 
event (A or B, or both). Each subject received one of the four question- 
naires. 
After completing the three problems contained in the main question- 
naire, the subject classified each marginal event in those problems as 
likely or unlikely, from his or her perspective. Specifically, the subject 
was asked to indicate whether each event or its complement was the one 
more likely to occur. 
Each subject participated in one of two large group sessions. 
Results 
For each problem, the number of disjunction errors, 0, 1, or 2, was 
recorded for each subject. It was also noted how the subject classified 
each marginal event as likely or unlikely. 
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TABLE 3 
MARGINAL EVENTS FOR DIWNCTION PROBLEMS IN STUDY 2 
Problem Event Likely Unlikely 
1 A Bo Derek will win an Bo Derek will not win an 
Oscar for her next film. Oscar for her next film. 
B The Soviet Union will The Soviet Union will not 
keep its troops in keep its troops in 
Afghanistan throughout Afghanistan throughout 
the remainder of this the remainder of this 
year. year. 
2 A Syria and Israel will not Syria and Israel will sign a 
sign a peace treaty by peace treaty by the end 
the end of this year. of this year. 
B The Bill Cosby show will The Bill Cosby show will 
be one of the top 10 not be one of the top 10 
rated television shows rated television shows 
at the completion of the at the completion of the 
198.5-86 television 1985-86 television 
season. season. 
3 A It will be cooler in Athens It will be warmer in 
on November 1 than on Athens on November 1 
January 1 this year. than on January 1 this 
year. 
B When the 1986 baseball When the 1986 baseball 
season ends, Pete Rose season ends, Pete Rose 
will still be the manager will no longer be the 
of the Cincinnati Reds manager of the 
baseball team. Cincinnati Reds 
baseball team. 
Disjunction errors occurred over 80% of the time in this experiment. 
This incidence of disjunction errors is even higher than that observed in 
Study 1. It is comparable to the rate of conjunction errors reported in 
previous studies (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1982, 1983). 
A loglinear analysis (Feinberg, 1977) was performed to evaluate the 
misunderstanding hypothesis. Subjects were classified by the number of 
disjunction errors they made, by the likelihood of the marginal events 
composing a disjunction, and by the wording of the disjunction, either (A 
or B) or (A or B, or both). A model which excluded all terms that included 
the wording of the disjunction fit the data well (x2(6) = 7.66, p = .264). 
Thus, there was no evidence that disjunction errors occurred because 
subjects misinterpreted the disjunction (A or B) as the event (A or B, but 
not both). The data were collapsed over the wording of the disjunction for 
the remaining analyses. 
Separate analyses were conducted for each of the three problems. The 
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TABLE 4 
PERCENTAGE OF DISJUNCTION ERRORS BY MARGINAL EVENT LIKELIHOOD IN STUDY 2 
Problem” 
Marginal 
Derek/USSR SyrialCosby’ Athens/Rosed 
events n 0 1 2 n 0 1 2 n 0 1 2 
LL 73 26.0 42.5 31.5 53 15.1 58.5 26.4 37 21.6 37.8 40.5 
LU 65 13.8 52.3 33.8 83 10.8 78.3 10.8 53 18.9 66.0 15.1 
UU 36 11.1 52.8 36.1 38 13.2 52.6 34.2 84 20.2 50.0 29.8 
a N = 174. 
b x*(4) = 5.12, p = .275. 
c x*(4) = 4.19, p = ,018. 
d x’(4) = 8.95, p = ,062. 
results are contained in Table 4. For eight of the nine possible compari- 
sons, single disjunction errors predominated (p < .OOl), as predicted by 
the signed averaging model. 
There was no reliable indication that the incidence of disjunction errors 
depended upon the judged likelihood of the marginal events in Problems 
1 and 3 (Problem 1: x’(4) = 5.12, p = .275; Problem 3: x2(4) = 8.95, p = 
.062). However, there was evidence of such a dependency in Problem 2 
(x2(4) = 11.90, p = .018). A 1 c oser examination of the second problem 
revealed that single disjunction errors were relatively less likely to occur 
when both marginal events were judged to be either likely or unlikely than 
when one of the marginal events was judged to be likely and one unlikely. 
This same pattern was also present in Problem 3, although, as reported, 
the implied effect was not statistically significant. 
Discussion 
Disjunction errors were observed frequently in both studies reported 
here. As the final study demonstrated, these errors cannot be attributed to 
subjects having different interpretations of the relevant events than were 
intended by the investigators. The pattern of disjunction errors was the 
same whether the disjunction was worded (A or B) or (A or B or both). 
Thus, these judgment patterns result from underlying processes that fol- 
low rules fundamentally different from probability theory principles. The 
proposed signed combination model of qualitative likelihood judgment is 
one candidate for what those rules are. 
As was the case for conjunction errors (Yates & Carlson, 1986), dis- 
junction errors have been obtained both for events which share a common 
generating process (Morier & Borgida, 1984) and, in this study, for events 
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which have distinct generating processes. This is what would be expected 
according to the signed averaging model. 
The present results do not mean that people misunderstand the con- 
cepts implicit in probability theory. As Nisbett, Krantz, Jepson, and 
Kunda (1983) demonstrated, people are quite capable of reasoning statis- 
tically in certain situations. Nor does it mean that people find the princi- 
ples of probability theory unacceptable. Indeed, we suspect that, if di- 
rectly confronted with the disagreement between their judgments and the 
extension rule, virtually all our subjects would say that their judgments 
must have been in error (cf. Tversky 62 Kahneman, 1983). 
The most defensible position is that people employ a variety of different 
judgment procedures. Among those procedures are applications of the 
extension concept, as in probability theory, heuristics such as represen- 
tativeness, causal reasoning schemas, formalistic routines, including the 
present signed combination rules, and undoubtedly others. As directly 
observed by Yates and Carlson (1986), within a short period of time a 
single individual can easily take several distinct approaches to problems 
that are formally equivalent to one another. And there must surely be 
individual differences in people’s tendencies to rely upon some judgment 
mechanisms rather than others. Thus, it is not surprising that the signed 
combination model (nor any other known model) cannot fully account for 
all the data in the existing studies. But it seems to safe to conclude that at 
least some of the subjects’ judgments arose from processes described by 
the signed combination model. 
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